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PREVIEW—United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River 
Preservation Association: Can the Pipeline Cross the Trail? 
 
Alizabeth A. Bronsdon* 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral argument 
in this matter on Monday, February 24, 2020, at 10 a.m. in the Supreme 
Court Building in Washington, D.C. Anthony Yang, Assistant to the 
Solicitor General, will likely argue for the United States. In a divided oral 
argument, Paul D. Clement will likely appear for Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
LLC, the petitioner in consolidated case No. 18-1587, Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association. Michael K. 
Kellogg will likely appear for the Respondents.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This case presents a narrow statutory interpretation question of 
federal public land law with broad implications regarding state 
sovereignty, private property rights, and the nation’s energy trajectory. 
The United States Forest Service1 (“Forest Service”) and pipeline builder 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (“Atlantic”) petitioned the Supreme Court 
for certiorari after the Fourth Circuit vacated a Forest Service-issued 
natural gas pipeline right-of-way across the Appalachian National Scenic 
Trail (“Appalachian Trail”) pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act2 
(“MLA”) in favor of Cowpasture River Preservation Association and a 
cadre of environmental groups3 (collectively “Respondents”). United 
States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association asks 
whether the Forest Service has the authority to grant rights-of-way under 
the MLA through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national 
forests.4 
 
* Alizabeth Bronsdon, J.D. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III 
School of Law at the University of Montana.   
 
1.  Federal petitioners, the United States Forest Service, an agency of 
the United States Department of the Agriculture, Kathleen Atkinson, in her 
official capacity as Regional Forester of the Eastern Region, and Ken Arney, in 
his official capacity as Acting Regional Forester of the Southern Region, were 
respondents in the court of appeals. 
2. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2018). 
3. Respondent non-profit groups Cowpasture River Preservation 
Association, Highlanders for Responsible Development, Shenandoah Valley 
Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network, Sierra Club, Virginia 
Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia, Inc. were petitioners in the court of 
appeals. 
4. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at I, Dec. 2, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Mineral Leasing Act authorizes “the Secretary of the Interior 
or appropriate agency head”5 with “jurisdiction over [the] Federal lands”6 
at issue to grant rights-of-way “for pipeline purposes for the transportation 
of oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid or gaseous fuels, or any refined product 
produced therefrom.”7 The MLA defines “Federal lands” as “all lands 
owned by the United States except lands in the National Park System.”8 
In 1968, the National Trails System Act9 (“Trails Act”) 
established the statutory framework for the Appalachian Trail, which 
traverses more than 2,000 mountainous miles from Maine to Georgia.10 
The Act charged the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) with overall 
administration of the Appalachian Trail.11 The Secretary then designated 
the National Park Service (“Park Service”) as the trail’s “land 
administering bureau.”12 The United States Forest Service (“Forest 
Service”), an agency within the Department of Agriculture, administers 
federal lands in the National Forest System, through which approximately 
1,000 miles of the Appalachian Trail crosses.13 In 1971, pursuant to the 
Trails Act, the Park Service and Forest Service agreed on the locations and 
“the width of the right-of-way for approximately 780 miles of [the] route 
within national forests.”14 The Appalachian Trail’s remaining 1,000-or-so 
miles traverse a combination of state and privately-owned lands, under 
appropriate easements,15 and other federal lands, like national parks.16 
The Atlantic Coast Pipeline (“ACP”) is a proposed 604.5-mile, 
42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to North 
Carolina.17 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) 
approved the pipeline in 2017 with twenty-one miles of the ACP’s 
 
5. 30 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
6. See id. § 185(b)(3) (“Agency head” means the head of any Federal 
department or independent Federal office or agency, other than the Secretary of 
the Interior, which has jurisdiction over Federal lands”). 
7. Id. § 185(a). 
8. See id. § 185(b)(1) (emphasis added).  
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1241–1249 (2018). 
10. Id. § 1244(a)(1). 
11. Id. 
12. Br. for Resp’ts at 5, Jan. 15, 2020, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587; see 
34 Fed. Reg. 14,337, 14,337 (Sept. 12, 1969).  
13. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 11. 
14. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 10. 
15. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 9 (citing Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, 
Trails for America: Report on the Nationwide Trail Study, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR 26 (1966) https://go.usa.gov/xpKnp); see S. REP. NO. 1233, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 2 (1968) (stating that agencies should “obtain scenic or other easements 
for rights-of-way necessary for the . . . public use of the trail, and the protection 
of the scenic and other qualities of the trail”). 
16. See Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 8–9. 
17. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150, 
155 (2018). 
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proposed route crossing the George Washington and Monongahela 
national forests.18 Atlantic submitted plans that include clear-cutting a 
125-foot right-of-way for most of that distance, digging a trench to bury 
the pipeline, and blasting and flattening ridgelines across mountainous 
terrain, directly impacting nearly 12,000 acres of national forest.19 To 
cross the Appalachian Trail, Atlantic proposed drilling a one-mile-long 
hole approximately 700 feet beneath the surface of a 0.1-mile stretch of 
trail.20 In January 2018, the Forest Service issued Atlantic a right-of-way 
and special-use permit for the ACP to cross two national forests under 
perceived MLA authority.21 
Following administrative appeals, Respondents petitioned the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit alleging violations 
of the MLA, the National Environmental Policy Act22 (“NEPA”), and the 
National Forest Management Act23 (“NFMA”) for the Forest Service’s 
failure to comply with its 2012 Forest Planning Rule and 2016 Planning 
Rule amendments.24 The Fourth Circuit held that the Forest Service had 
violated NEPA and NFMA, and because the trail is administered by the 
Secretary of the Interior as part of the National Park System, “the Forest 
Service [did] not have statutory authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way 
across the [Appalachian Trial] pursuant [to] the MLA.”25 
The Fourth Circuit denied an en banc rehearing on February 25, 
2019. On June 25, 2019, the Forest Service and Atlantic petitioned for 
certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted the petitions 
and consolidated the cases on October 4, 2019. The sole issue before the 
Court is whether the Forest Service has authority under the MLA to grant 
rights-of-way through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail. 
III.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The parties disagree about whether the Forest Service has the 
authority to grant rights-of-way across the Appalachian Trail. Petitioners 
contend that national forest lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail 
remain in the National Forest System and the Forest Service has statutory 
authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way through national forest lands. 
Respondents argue that the Appalachian Trail is a unit of the National Park 
System and the MLA excludes all federal lands in the National Park 
System. Therefore, a pipeline cannot cross federal land within the National 




20. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 12, Dec. 2, 2019, No. 18-1587; Fed. 
Pet’rs’ Pet. for Cert. at 7, June 25, 2019, No. 18-1584. 
21. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 160. 
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4361 (2018). 
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2018). 
24. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 161; see also Planning Rule, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 21,162 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric. April 9, 2012); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.8–219.11. 
25. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 181. 
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A. The Forest Service’s Arguments 
The Forest Service contends the MLA’s exclusion for “lands in 
the National Park System” does not apply in this case because the 
“National Park System” definition only encompasses (1) areas of “land” 
(or “water”) that are (2) “administered” by the Secretary of the Interior, 
acting through the Park Service.26 The Forest Service claims the Trails Act 
defines the Appalachian Trail as a “footpath,” or “trail”—but not “land”—
and the authority to administer the trail is different than the authority to 
administer the lands traversed by the trail.27 The Forest Service relies upon 
the Week’s Act,28 which solidified its administrative jurisdiction over all 
national forest lands when it “permanently reserved, held, and 
administered” the federal lands at issue “as national forest lands.”29 The 
Forest Service argues that federal lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail 
remain under the administrative jurisdiction of other federal agencies.30 
The Forest Service claims that where Congress intended to transfer 
administrative jurisdiction over federal land from one agency to another, 
it has done so clearly in the statutory text.31 Because the Trails Act does 
not provide for agency land “transfer[s],” the Forest Service argues that it 
is the appropriate authority to grant an underground pipeline right-of-way 
through federal lands in a national forest under the MLA, even when those 
lands are traversed by the Appalachian Trail.32 
 
26. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 21 (“The ‘National Park System’ includes 
‘any area of land and water administered by the Secretary, acting through the 
Director [of the Park Service], for park, monument, historic, parkway, 
recreational, or other purposes.”) (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100102(2), 100501 (Supp. 
V 2017) (enacted 2014)); see 16 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970) (materially similar; repealed 
2014)). 
27. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 17, 19 (“Congress spoke clearly in the Trails 
Act: The Appalachian Trail is ‘a trail’—not land—and the Act directs the 
Secretary of the Interior only to ‘administer[]’ the ‘trail’ primarily as a ‘footpath.’ 
16 U.S.C. 1244(a)(1).”) (“Congress expressly provided in the Trails Act that its 
assignment of ‘overall administration of a trail’ across the surface of lands does 
not ‘transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established 
under any other law for federally administered lands.’ 16 U.S.C. 1246(a)(1)(A) 
(emphases added).”). 
28. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 5 (“In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson 
established [the George Washington National Forest] . . . pursuant to the Weeks 
Act, which provides that the relevant lands ‘shall be permanently reserved, held, 
and administered as national forest lands’ . . . .”) (internal citations omitted)); 16 
U.S.C. § 521 (2018). 
29. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 20 (“The Secretary of Agriculture is vested 
with administrative ‘jurisdiction of the national forests,’ United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 709 n.18 (1978); see 16 U.S.C. 472, and the Secretary has 
delegated to the Forest Service that authority to ‘administer[] and manage[]’ the 
federal ‘land in the National Forests,’ 36 C.F.R. 200.3(b)(2)).”); 16 U.S.C. § 521. 
30. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 30. 
31. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 17. 
32. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 16–17. 
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The Forest Service further contends that the Secretary’s 
responsibility for the “overall administration” of the trail33 “quite plainly 
does not grant authority to the Secretary to administer all of the state, local, 
and private ‘lands’ that the Trail traverses.”34 In fact, it claims Congress’s 
language in the Trails Act indicates the Secretary’s limited authority is 
based on the need to “insure continuity” of the route and to “coordinate 
the efforts of the participating [federal and state] agencies.”35 
Critically, the Forest Service maintains the Fourth Circuit’s ruling 
would significantly alter the legal framework governing public land 
administration within national parks and national monuments.36 It argues 
that interpreting the Trails Act as the Fourth Circuit suggests would require 
transferring administrative jurisdiction over all state, private and federal 
lands beneath a nationally designated trail—an “obviously incorrect”  
conclusion—with the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail (“Pacific Crest 
Trail”) underscoring that point.37  
The Pacific Crest Trail is a national trail that extends 
approximately 2,350 miles “from the Mexican-California border 
northward generally along the mountain ranges of the west coast States to 
the Canadian-Washington border.”38 At its inception, the Trails Act 
granted the Secretary of the Interior the authority to administer the 
Appalachian Trail and the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to 
administer the Pacific Crest Trail.39 Under the Fourth Circuit’s logic, the 
Forest Service argues that grant of authority would have consequentially 
removed the land beneath the Pacific Crest Trail from the National Park 
System.40 Taken to its logical conclusion, the Forest Service argues this 
would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to grant pipeline rights-of-
way pursuant to the MLA under the route of the Pacific Crest Trail through 
national parks and national monuments.41 
Finally, the Forest Service contends the logic of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision would effectuate a “sweeping prohibition against 
pipeline rights-of-ways under the MLA for all federally owned land 
crossed by the roughly 2000-mile-long Appalachian Trail.”42  
 
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A). 
34. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 34. 
35. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 35 (citing Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, 
Trails for America: Report on the Nationwide Trail Study, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR 25, 32 (1966), https://go.usa.gov/xpKnp).  
36. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36. 
37. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36, 40. 
38. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36; 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(2); see 16 U.S.C. § 
1241(b). 
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1244(a)(2), 1246(a)(1)(A). 
40. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 37; cf. 54 U.S.C. § 100102(2), 100501 (Supp. 
V. 2017) (defining “National Park System” as the areas of land or water 
“administered” by the Secretary of the Interior though the Park Service). 
41. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 37; see 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), (b)(1). 
42. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 41. 
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B. Atlantic’s Arguments 
Atlantic’s argument hinges on similar statutory interpretation and 
the premise that overall administrative authority and administration or 
jurisdiction over federal lands are not the same.43 Atlantic claims that 
although the Trails Act designates administrative authority over the 
Appalachian Trail footpath itself, it does not divest federal agencies of 
ownership or jurisdiction over the federal lands through which the trail 
passes.44 Moreover, Atlantic argues an agency’s responsibility to 
administer a national trail should not displace the jurisdiction of other 
federal agencies over the federal lands, and agencies have historically 
understood that it does not.45 Supporting its claim, Atlantic points to § 
1246(a)(1)(A) of the Trails Act, which states that “[n]othing contained in 
[the Act] shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any 
management responsibilities established under any other law for federally 
administered lands.”46  
Comparing the Trails Act to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act47 (“Rivers Act”), which Congress enacted on the same day in 1968, 
Atlantic contends Congress “knew how to effect a land transfer between 
federal agencies and did not do so in the Trails Act.”48 Atlantic argues the 
Rivers Act differs from the Trails Act in several key respects. First, while 
the Trails Act empowers the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture to 
negotiate rights-of-way for national trails, the Rivers Act authorizes them 
to acquire federal lands49 and “transfer to the appropriate secretary 
jurisdiction over such lands.”50 Crucially, Atlantic claims the Rivers Act 
specifies that if the lands are transferred to the Secretary of Agriculture, 
then the lands “shall upon such acquisition or transfer become national 
forest lands.”51 On the other hand, “[a]ny component of the national wild 
and scenic rivers system that is administered by the Secretary of the 
Interior through the National Park Service shall become a part of the 
national park system.”52 Thus, Atlantic maintains that under the Trails Act, 
the Secretary selected and negotiated rights-of-way to create the trail, but 
the state and private lands he selected did not consequently become federal 
lands when they were designated part of the trail’s route.53 
Illustrating this idea, Atlantic points to the Appalachian Trail 
itself, which traverses sixty state game lands, forests, and parks; one 
national wildlife refuge; six national parks; eight national forests; and 
 
43. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 18. 
44. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 20. 
45. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 49. 
46. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 2.  
47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2018). 
48. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 18. 
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 1277. 
50. Id. § 1277(e). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. § 1281(c).  
53. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 24. 
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privately held lands.54 Atlantic notes days after enacting the Trails Act and 
designating the Appalachian Trail as a footpath to be administered by the 
Secretary, Congress extended the Blue Ridge Parkway, and in doing so, 
directed the Secretary to “relocate and reconstruct portions of the 
Appalachian Trail . . . that may be disturbed by the parkway extension . . 
. upon national forest lands with the approval of the Secretary of 
Agriculture.”55 Atlantic argues Congress expressly gave the Park Service 
authority to grant rights-of-way through the Blue Ridge Parkway, thus 
ensuring that the Parkway “would not be a 469-mile barrier to 
development.”56 Atlantic contends that if Congress intended the Trails Act 
to place an impermeable wall between western resources and the coast, it 
would not have included such specific language when it created the Blue 
Ridge Parkway.57  
Finally, Atlantic maintains the Fourth Circuit’s decision produces 
illogical results, which are inconsistent with land management to date.58  
As examples, Atlantic cites a Forest Service regulation, a directors order, 
a department manual, an Environmental Assessment, and a Record of 
Decision—all demonstrating the Park Service’s unambiguous 
understanding that the Appalachian Trail is “multi-jurisdictional,” with 
only select “segments of the trail under the primary land management 
responsibility of the National Park Service.”59 In addition to the more than 
fifty pipelines that currently cross national forest lands beneath the 
Appalachian Trail, Atlantic claims the Forest Service has granted rights-
of-way for electrical transmission lines, telecommunications sites, 
municipal water facilities, roads, and grazing areas.60 
Atlantic concludes that because the Trails Act did not divest the 
Forest Service of its jurisdiction over the land beneath the Appalachian 
Trail, as Respondents contend and the Fourth Circuit held, the Forest 
Service has clear statutory authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way under 
the MLA.61 To hold otherwise, Atlantic claims, would constitute a massive 
land transfer between federal agencies and stifle much-needed energy and 
infrastructure development.62 
 
54. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 24. 
55. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 31 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 460a-7(3) (2018) 
(emphasis added by Atlantic)). 
56. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 22. 
57. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 18. 
58. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 19. 
59. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 34; 48 Fed. Reg. 30,253 (June 30, 1983); 
Director’s Order No. 45: National Trails System 6–8 (2013); Dep’t of the Interior, 
710 Department Manual 1.4(C)(4) (1977); FERC, Giles Cty. Project Envtl. 
Assessment, Dkt. No. CP13-125-000 (Nov. 2013), at *5; Dep’t of Agric., 
Mountain Valley Pipeline Project Record of Decision (Dec. 2017), *22–24, 
available at https://bit.ly/35fkn2k. 
60. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 49. 
61. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 11. 
62. See Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 43, 48. 
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C. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents’ alternative interpretation suggests that as a “unit” of 
the National Park System,63 the entire Appalachian Trail corridor is 
outside the scope of the MLA.64 Respondents contend the Trails Act, the 
National Park Service Organic Act65 (“Organic Act”), as well as legislative 
history and agency publications, confirm the Park Service’s administration 
over the Appalachian Trail, which is among “lands in the National Park 
System” and thus exempt from agency approval pursuant to the MLA.66 
Respondents argue Congress’s directive for the Park Service to administer 
lands “in such a manner and by such means as will leave [it] unimpaired 
for the enjoyment of future generations”67 leaves no question of intent.68 
Therefore, Respondents maintain, Congress clearly and intentionally 
required its “direct” and “specific” approval for pipeline rights-of-way 
over lands in the National Park System.69 
Respondents contend Petitioners mistakenly distinguish between 
“footpath” and “land” to further their argument that the trail is only a right-
of-way and not a “unit” of the National Park System.70 Respondents argue 
this is an illogical distinction because “neither the Trails Act nor the 
Organic Act distinguishes between ‘land’ and ‘footpaths’ any more than 
they distinguish between ‘land’ and the various monuments, historic 
buildings, parkways, and recreation areas that are also units of the National 
Park System.”71 Congress’s use of the term “footpath,” they argue, means 
only that the trail is “intended primarily for use by pedestrians, as opposed 
to mountain bikers or ATV drivers.”72 
Respondents claim the Trails Act carefully distinguishes between 
trail “administration” and “management” of trail segments.73 The entire 
Appalachian Trail is “administered” by the Secretary, who delegated that 
 
63. Br. for Resp’ts at 2, 24 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100102(6) (“Lands 
administered by the Park Service are defined as Park “System unit[s].”)).  
64. Br. for Resp’ts at 14 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1) (“Federal 
lands” means all lands owned by the United States except lands in the National 
Park System.”)). 
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1–18(f) (2018). 
66. Br. for Resp’ts at 5 (“The Organic Act that established the System 
in 1916 now defines it as ‘any area of land and water administered by the 
Secretary, acting through the [Park Service] Director, for park, monument, 
historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.’”) (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100501)). 
67. Br. for Resp’ts at 3; 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a). 
68. Br. for Resp’ts at 15. 
69. Br. for Resp’ts at 6 (“The Park Service’s authorities ‘shall be 
construed . . . in light of’ and not ‘exercised in derogation of the values and 
purposes for which the System units have been established, except as directly and 
specifically provided by Congress.’”) (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(2)). 
70. Br. for Resp’ts at 2. 
71. Br. for Resp’ts at 3. 
72. Br. for Resp’ts at 3. 
73. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33, Aug. 28, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587. 
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authority to the Park Service.74 Under Respondents’ theory, the Trails Act 
assigns different roles to agencies that administer land surrounding a trail 
(“administering lands through which the trail route passes”),75 agencies 
that manage trail segments (“management responsibilities”),76 and trail 
administers (“administering and managing the trail”).77 Administration, 
Respondents maintain, encompasses duties such as selecting, acquiring, 
and regulating the land that makes up the trail.78 While they acknowledge 
the administrator can transfer “management” responsibility for segments 
to other agencies, Respondents argue he cannot transfer congressionally 
assigned “administration” of the entire trail.79  
Respondents contend that, because in administering National Park 
System units such as the Appalachian Trail the Park Service is prohibited 
from exercising its authority “in derogation of the values and purposes for 
which the System units have been established,”80 the plain statutory text 
of the MLA logically precludes agency approval across national park lands 
for pipelines carrying toxic oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid or gaseous 
fuels.81 Thus, Respondents assert that oil and gas pipelines can only obtain 
new rights-of-way across federal lands in the National Park System 
through case-by-case legislation.82 
Finally, Respondents push back against Petitioners’ policy 
arguments, pointing out that new pipelines can cross the Appalachian Trail 
on state or private land, and also across federals lands with existing 
easements, which are unaffected by the MLA.83 Criticizing another of 
Petitioners’ arguments, Respondent’s argue the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
in this case does nothing to obstruct or prohibit other essential 
infrastructure across national park lands because Congress granted the 
 
74. Br. for Resp’ts at 5 (“The Trails Act left ownership and day-to-
day management of Trail lands with existing owners rather than condemning 
those lands for federal ownership . . . But Congress charged the Secretary of the 
Interior (the ‘Secretary’) with the ‘administ[ration]’ of the entire Trail, no matter 
who owns the land. The Secretary in turn designated the Park Service as the 
Trail’s ‘land administering bureau.’” (internal citations omitted)); see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1244(a)(1); 34 Fed. Reg. 14,337, 14,337 (Sept. 12, 1969). 
75. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(d)(1)). 
76. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)). 
77. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A)). 
78. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 3 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(a)–(c), (h)–
(i)). 
79. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(B)). 
80. Br. for Resp’ts at 6; 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(2). 
81. Br. for Resp’ts at 14; see 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(a)–(b)(1). 
82. Br. for Resp’ts 7–8 (“Congress has authorized pipeline rights-of-
way crossing System units ‘at Denali National Park, Glacier National Park, Great 
Smoky Mountains and Gateway National Recreation Area.’”) (citing Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Resources of the H. Comm. on 
Natural Resources on H.R. 2295 (May 20, 2015) (statement of Timothy Spisak, 
Senior Advisor, Minerals and Realty Management, Bureau of Land Management, 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior)). 
83. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 16–17. 
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Secretary express authority under the Organic Act to secure rights of way 
for power lines, telephone lines, and certain “canals, ditches, pipes and 
pipe lines, flumes, tunnels, or other water conduits,” but not for pipelines 
that carry oil or gas.84 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This argument involves a narrow issue hinged on technical 
statutory construction, precise language, and congressional intent. 
However, buried below the legal and legislative clutter lie the broader 
issues of state sovereignty and private property interests, which are tied to 
the nation’s energy trajectory. As evidenced by the litany of states that 
have expressed interest in the case, the Court will ultimately decide 
whether the Fourth Circuit’s holding85 implicates overreaching Park 
Service authority over other federal agencies, states, and private entities 
that currently own or manage national trail components.86 The Court’s 
analysis will likely involve a deep dive into the public lands statutes that 
consume much of the parties’ arguments; however, Petitioners’ policy 
arguments and stated consequences of upholding the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision may persuade a majority of the Court to reverse so the pipeline 
company can make another attempt at environmental compliance.  
A. Statutory Interpretation 
The Court will likely uphold the Fourth Circuit’s decision denying 
the Forest Service authority to grant the pipeline a right-of-way across the 
Appalachian Trail. The Court’s dicta in Sturgeon v. Frost87 indicates it will 
find Respondents’ statutory interpretation persuasive.88 In that case, which 
involved the regulation of an Alaskan river through a national park, the 
unanimous Court noted “statutory grants of power make no distinctions 
based on the ownership of either lands or waters (or lands beneath waters) 
. . . rules about mining and solid-waste disposal, for example, apply to all 
lands within [national park] system units ‘whether federally or 
nonfederally owned.’”89 Sturgeon involved regulations on water, not land, 
and was further complicated by the Alaska National Interest Lands 
 
84. Br. for Resp’ts at 7 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 100902). 
85. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 181 (holding “the Forest Service does 
not have statutory authority to grant pipeline rights of way across the 
[Appalachian Trail] pursuant to the MLA”).  
86. Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs at 32, 
Dec. 9, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587. 
87. 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (holding non-public lands within Alaska’s 
national parks are exempt from the Park Service’s ordinary regulatory authority). 
88. Id. at 1076 (“[T]he Secretary, acting through the Director of the 
Park Service, has broad authority under the National Park Service Organic Act 
(Organic Act), 39 Stat. 535, to administer both lands and waters within all system 
units in the country” (citing 54 U.S.C. §§ 100751, 100501, 100102)). 
89. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 6.2, § 9.2). 
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Conservation Act90 (“ANILCA”), but this statement, among others,91 
supports broad Park Service authority, which the Court limited in 
Sturgeon, only because “Alaska is different.”92 
Petitioners’ alarmist claim that the Fourth Circuit’s rule would 
suddenly convey all National Park System jurisdiction to the Forest 
Service along the Pacific Crest Trail, paving the way for future pipeline 
development across it, is unlikely to resonate with the Court. The Trails 
Act mandates cross-agency consultation and grants both Secretaries the 
authority to negotiate appropriate cooperative management agreements.93 
These requirements mean that both Secretaries are empowered and 
constrained by the Trails Act, not to mention their respective Organic Acts, 
which prescribe limitations on land use that is inconsistent with 
Congress’s stated national interests of preservation and enjoyment of 
outdoor areas.94 The Forest Service cites the 1971 Pacific Crest Trail 
agreement, in which it and the Park Service determined that the trail’s 
segments crossing eight national parks and national monuments traverse 
lands that should remain under the “administrative jurisdiction[] of . . . the 
National Park Service.”95 However, this quote does not support what 
Petitioners contend. To the contrary, the document confirms both 
Secretaries agreed Park Service authority would best secure the necessary 
protection for those parks and the resources therein.96 Considering these 
clear statutory safeguards, the Court is likely to find Petitioners’ 
unintended consequences argument too attenuated.  
If the Court sides with Petitioners on the threshold question that 
the trail is not “land” under the law, then Respondents’ statutory analysis 
fails. However, Petitioners’ position in this regard is problematic as the 
Appalachian Trail Conservancy highlights in its amicus brief supporting 
 
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2018) (ANILCA provides “protection 
for the national interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values 
on public lands in Alaska. . . .”). 
91. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1080 (“Alaska is often the exception, not 
the rule”; “[i]f Sturgeon lived in any other State, his suit would not have a prayer 
of success”). 
92. Id. at 1069 (quoting Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 
(2016) (“Sturgeon I”). 
93. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). 
94. See id. § 1241(a); see also id. §§ 1, 475. 
95. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36–37 (citing United States Forest Service, 
Comprehensive Management Plan for the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. App. D, at 1 (1982) https://go.usa.gov/xpKnh). 
96. Comprehensive at 2, supra note 104, Characteristics of Pacific 
Crest Trail, adopted by Advisory Council May 16, 1980, (“[The] Pacific Crest 
National Scenic Trail is . . . located, designed, constructed, and maintained to a 
standard commensurate with its National significance, while reflecting the type 
and volume of traffic planned: limited by the standards established for special 
legislated areas (national parks, national monuments, wilderness, state parks) 
through which it passes.”). 
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neither party.97 Citing a House Report from 1968 precisely on point, the 
Conservancy notes the statute’s use of the term “footpath” means only that 
the Appalachian Trail is meant for foot traffic.98 
Finally, Petitioners’ argument that there is nothing in the text to 
indicate Congress intended to transfer federal land management across the 
entire Appalachian Trail might be compelling to those justices who feel 
the Court should not be a roadblock to nation-wide development.99 The 
Court may decide the Fourth Circuit went too far in denying the Forest 
Service authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way under the MLA because 
under that reasoning, the MLA would give no federal agency that power.100 
However, because Congress has acted in the past to secure rights-of-way 
across national park lands, it is unlikely the Court will agree with 
Petitioners. In light of the statutory construction, and the high value 
Congress placed on the nation’s scenic and historic trails, the Court will 
likely find that an act of Congress is both the intended and appropriate path 
to natural gas pipeline approval through national parks. 
B. State Sovereignty and Private Property Rights 
West Virginia and a coalition of sixteen states submitted an 
amicus brief in support of Petitioners, warning that to deem all federal land 
crossed by the Appalachian Trail as “lands in the National Park System” 
would severely limit state and private property rights and inhibit pipeline 
development against Congress’s intent at the expense of the states and 
national economy.101 The Court is likely to reject this argument on 
statutory grounds. The states’ claim, which Atlantic also promotes, that 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision could subordinate state agencies that manage 
the land across which thousands of miles of national trails traverse is 
unfounded because the MLA only applies to “land owned by the United 
States,”102 and expressly exempts national park lands from that definition. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision does not constitute uncompensated takings 
of state or private land because those lands remain under state or private 
 
97. Br. of Amicus Curiae the Appalachian Trail Conservancy in Sup’t 
of None of the Parties at 18, Dec. 9. 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587. 
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1631, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. at 10 (1968) 
(noting that “primarily as a footpath” meant the Trail “primarily” for hikers but 
might be appropriate for travel such as horseback riding where such uses were 
“accepted and customary”). 
99. See Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs  
at 25–26. 
100. Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs  at 21 
(“The practical consequences of this decision give life to Congress’s concerns in 
1920 and 1973 about undue restrictions on needed energy development.”). 
101. Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs  (citing 
Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 181). 
102. 30 U.S.C. § 185(a), (b)(1). 
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ownership and those landowners have and may continue to grant rights-
of-way for pipelines under state law.103 
Implicating another approach to the state sovereignty debate, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, which sides with Respondents, argues that the 
writ of certiorari should be dismissed as Virginia neither needs nor desires 
the ACP.104 Virginia contends that the pipeline company’s environmental 
record supports its concerns that the pipeline would do more harm than 
good to Virginia’s prized national resources and its economy.105 Virginia, 
a state with significant coal production,106 attacks Atlantic’s argument that 
a massive natural gas pipeline is needed to meet growing energy 
demands.107 Citing, among other sources, a 2017 report from the United 
States Energy Information Administration, Virginia contends the demand 
for natural gas in Virginia and North Carolina is projected to decrease 
between 2015 and 2020.108 Interestingly, Virginia’s coal output increased 
for the second-straight year in 2018, and Virginia now ranks thirteenth 
among the nation’s twenty-four coal-producing states, with a 1.7 percent 
share of the national total.109 
It is unlikely that the Petitioners’ private property takings 
argument will persuade the Court because all of the land along the 
Appalachian Trail corridor was obtained through purchase for just 
compensation or negotiated land easements and cooperative agreements. 
Therefore, the Secretary’s regulatory authority under those respective 
agreements, which the Court recognized in Sturgeon110 is significant, is 
not suddenly implicated because of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. 
C. Energy and Environmental Implications 
Ultimately, the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine 
dictates that the judiciary is not the proper branch of government to debate 
whether the Atlantic Coast Pipeline is a project worth pursuing—that is a 
political debate for Congress. However, should the Court confirm the 
 
103. Br. for Resp’ts at 47. 
104.  Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 2, Jan. 22, 2020, 
No. 18-1584 & 18-1587. 
105. Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 8 (“In Virginia 
alone, the proposed route crosses three celebrated national features: the George 
Washington National Forest, the Blue Ridge Parkway, and the Appalachian Trail 
. . . attract[ing] more than three million visitors per year.”). 
106. Coal Production in Virginia, VA. DIV. OF GEOLOGY & MINERAL 
RES., https://www.dmme.virginia.gov/dgmr/coal.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) 
(“Mining operations in Virginia produced 13.0 million short tons of coal in 2018 
with an estimated market value just over $1.0 billion.”). 
107. Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 5. 
108. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 5–7. 
109. Coal Production in Virginia, supra note 112. 
110. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1076 (“[The] Park Service ‘has broad 
authority . . . to administer both lands and waters within all system units,’ and it 
sometimes ‘impose[s] major restrictions’ on ‘non federally owned lands’ 
(frequently called ‘inholdings’) ‘within [System unit] boundaries.’”). 
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Fourth Circuit’s holding, the pipeline project’s viability would turn bleak. 
Atlantic argues the Fourth Circuit’s decision is a “statutory impediment” 
to all pipeline rights-of-way on federal lands.111 The completed ACP 
would transport up to 1.5 million dekatherms (about 1.5 billion cubic feet) 
of natural gas daily to markets in Virginia and North Carolina for which 
the government contends existing infrastructure, renewable energy, and 
conservation were not “practical alternatives.”112 Pipeline advocates argue 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision is “profoundly wrong, entirely definitive, and 
imposes enormous real-world costs.”113 Despite these implications for 
pipeline developers, the Court will not likely succumb to Petitioners’ 
political arguments because such a decision would constitute judicial 
intrusion into the operations of the other branches of government.114 As 
Respondents argue, “[W]here the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”115 
The Fourth Circuit found clear and consequential deficiencies in 
the Forest Service’s evaluation of the ACP’s potential environmental 
impacts.116 Notably, the Forest Service altogether failed to follow 
established statutory and regulatory mandates, like the duty to explore 
alternative routes across vulnerable and valuable federal forest lands.117 
Atlantic contends these longstanding statutory protections for land in the 
National Park System are “costly and time-consuming.”118 However, the 
Court is unlikely to be swayed by the noisy boom of natural gas 
development, and should side with the Fourth Circuit and Respondents in 
order to protect the national interests recognized by Congress when it 
enacted the Trails Act over fifty years ago.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court will likely consider the Appalachian Trail “land” within 
the National Park System and uphold the Fourth Circuit’s statutory 
interpretation of the Mineral Leasing Act, which prohibits pipeline 
development on such land absent express approval by Congress. The 
Court’s recent and unanimous support of the strong language in Sturgeon 
points to a consensus among the justices that congressional intent behind 
federal public land statutes remains a powerful force in safeguarding 
national treasures from the demands of irresponsible development. 
 
111. Reply Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 11, Sept. 11, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 
18-1587.  
112. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 13. 
113. Reply Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 12.  
114. ERWIN CHERMINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 144 (6th ed. 2019). 
115. Br. for Resp’ts at 46 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917)). 
116. See Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 150. 
117. Id. at 168. 
118. Reply Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 12. 
